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MINIMAX-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE BEST-CHOICE PROBLEM WHEN
A BOUND IS KNOWN FOR THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF OBJECTS*
T. E HILL AND D. E KENNEDY
Abstract. For the best-choice (or secretary) problem with an unknown number N of objects, minimax-optimal
strategies for the observer and minimax distributions for N are derived under the assumption that N is a random
variable with expected value at most M, where M is known. The solution is derived as a special case of the situation
where N is constrained by Ef(N) <_ M, where f is increasing with f(i) f(i 1) convex.
Key words, best-choice problem; secretary problem; minimax strategies" optimal stopping; convexity" La-
grangian; Lagrange multiplier
AMS subject classification. 60G40
1. Introduction. In the classical best-choice (or secretary) problem a known fixed num-
ber, n, of rankable objects is presented one by one in random order (all n! possible orderings
being equally likely). As each object is presented, the observer must either select it and stop
observing or reject it and continue observing. He may never return to a previously rejected
object, and his decision to stop must be based solely on the relative ranks of the objects he
has observed so far. The goal is to maximize the probability that the best object is selected.
For a history and review of the literature of this problem and its numerous variants the reader
is referred to Freeman (1983) and Ferguson (1989). In the best-choice setting, the optimal
strategy for the observer is to view kn objects without selecting and subsequently to take the
first object, if any, better than all its predecessors, where k 0 and for n > 1, kn is the
unique positive integer satisfying
n--I n--Il>l> Z
i:kn i:kn+l
If the number of objects is not known, but is a random variable taking values in the positive
integers, then minimax-optimal strategies for selecting the best object are known for several
situations (cf. Freeman (1983), Ferguson (1989)). For example, Presman and Sonin (1972)
derived the optimal stop rules when the distribution ofN is known, and Hill and Krengel (1991)
found minimax-optimal stop rules (and distributions) when N has unknown distribution but
known upper bound n. It is the purpose of this paper to derive the analogous minimax-optimal
strategies when N again has unknown distribution, but has expectation at most M, where M
is known. Since the arguments in this case generalize easily to the constraint Ef(N) < M,
where f is a known positive function for which f(i) f(i 1) is nondecreasing and convex,
the proofs will be given in the more general setting. The reader may want to keep in mind the
natural case f (i) i, which corresponds to the expected-value constraint.
In the (zero-sum, two-person) game-theoretic interpretation of this problem there are two
players, a controller P and an observer Q. Given M > 0 and a constraint function f, player
P first picks a distribution for the number of objects, subject to the constraint E(f(N)) <_ M,
and then the actual number N of objects to be presented to Q is chosen randomly according
to this distribution. Then, knowing only the constraint (and not N itself), player Q begins
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his observation-selection of the objects and receives one dollar from player P if the object he
selects is the best of the N objects and pays player Q one dollar if it is not the best.
Formally, the strategies available to the two players are given as follows. For M > f(1),
the set of allowable strategies for player P is
{ }7M-- P--(P,P2,’")’P >_ O, pi l, f(j)pj <_ Mj=l
(the set of distributions for N for which Ef(N) <_ M), and
Q= {q--(ql,q2,’")’0_< qj <_ 1}
is the set of allowable strategies for player Q, where if strategy q is used player Q stops at
object j with probability qj (independently of the rest of the process) if object j is the best
so far. If the strategies p, q are used by the respective players, the pay-off function V(p, q),







For each value of M >_ f(1), the aim is to derive minimax-optimal strategies PM
qM E Q satisfying
(2) V(p,q) < V(p,q) < V(p, qM for all p 79, q Q.
Example 1.1. As will follow from the main results below, for the optimal strategies
when N is a random variable with expected value at most 3, the optimal strategy for the
observer is (, 1, 1,...), i.e., stop with the first object with probability , and otherwise
stop with the first object thereafter, if any, that is better than any previously seen. Using
16this strategy, the best object will be selected with probability at least no matter what the
distribution of N is, provided its expectation is at most 3. Conversely, the optimal P-strategy
(worst-case distribution) for this case is (, 0, , , 0, 0,...), i.e., there is only the one
object with probability , exactly three objects with probability , and exactly four objects
with probability ; and against this distribution no stop rule will select the best object with
16probability exceeding .
That the optimal Q-strategy is monotonic is intuitive (since if it is good to stop at time j
with the best object seen so far, it is even better to stop at later times if that object is the best
yet seen), but that the optimal P-strategy typically (as in Example 1.1) places mass on two
large numbers seems surprising, and it is never the case for the uniformly bounded problem.
In general, the optimal value is a complicated piecewise linear function of the form A / #M
for appropriate A and #. It will be seen that there are real numbers a < a2 < ".., such that
the minimax-optimal qM is constant over each interval a < M _< a+, while the minimax-
optimal PM is linear in M in the interval and is thus a convex combination of the distributions
that are optimal at the end points M a and M a+. The next example, which identifies
values and optimal strategies for an interval of values of M (including the special case M 3
of Example 1.1), shows typical behavior of the optimal strategies and value as M varies.
Example 1.2. As will follow from the main results below, for the expected-value constraint
f(i) =_ i, the optimal strategies and value for 19/7 <_ M <_ 317/75 are as follows.
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If 19/7 _< M < 101/29"
qM-- (1-,1,1,’’’);
(16) (2_ 24 )7,0, 7,0,0,...
where aM 7(101 29M)/156;
V(pM,qM (47 5M)/78.
If 101/29 _< M < 69/17"
105
\-]-, 1, 1,.
( 24) (1- 410)pM=bM ,0,0,-,0,... /(1--bM) ,O,O,-i,-i-,O,...
where bM 29(69 17M)/284;
V(Pvt,qM) (459- 39M)/852.
If69/17 < M < 317/75"
50 14
..);qM-- 107’ 19’
(7 ) (132 60 )4 10 0,0,... +(1--cM)
-
0,0,- 0,...PM- CM ,0,0, 17’ 17’
where cM 17(317 75M)/214;
V(PM,qM (54 4M)/107.
Although the statements of the main results in this article are probabilistic in nature, the
proofs are primarily optimization-theoretic. Since general optimization theory saddle-point
theorems do not seem to yield a direct solution to the problem formulated here, optimization
arguments using a Lagrangian, but heavily based on ad hoc convexity tools, have been devel-
oped. In principle, one could use the same techniques to handle a larger class of constraint
functions such as those reflecting known bounds on means and variances (or several other
moments), but this would involve examination of the many cases corresponding to criticality
of the various constraints and is not done here.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, important
parameters, and the value of the game and establishes a number of useful identities and
inequalities, the proofs of which may be skipped at first reading. Section 3 identifies the
minimax-optimal strategy for the observer player Q, which is obtained by solving for the
coefficient of pj/j in a Lagrangian, and 4 builds on these results to establish the optimal
(worst-case) distribution for N (i.e., the minimax-optimal strategy for the controller player
P), and summarizes all the results in the main theorem, Theorem 4.3.
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2. Notation, preliminaries and the value of the game. The first lemma records some
easy convexity results; the proof is left to the reader.
LEMMA 2.1. Suppose 9 -+ (0, x). Then
(i) 9 is convex (respectively, strictly convex) if and only if 9(i) 9(i 1) is nonde-
creasing (increasing) in i;
(ii) if9 is convex (respectively, strictly convex), then -]j=k+l 9(j)/(i k) is convex
(strictly convex) in > k for each k >_ O.
Basic assumption. Throughout this paper, f(0) 0 and f --+ (0, x) and
(3) f(i) f(i 1) is nondecreasing and convex,
the canonical example being f (i) _-- i.
Let so 0, sk Y’=l 1/j fork _> and for _< k < n, sets sn-s and
F nf(n) kf (k).
LEMMA 2.2. For all such f,
(i) f (i) is increasing and convex on E
(ii) if(i) is increasing and strictly convex on ;
(iii) if(i) (i 1)f(i 1) is increasing and convex on
(iv) s/(n k) is decreasing and strictly convex in n > k;
(v) F/(n k) is increasing and convex in n > k;
(vi) F/ r-l is increasing in n > k,8k_
(vii) F.+’ i > fkk+l k-i f(j)n-k4i > > f(k) > (.-j=l i + f(k))/sk.
Proof. The proof is routine, using (3), Lemma 2.1 and the definitions of s and Fff. []
The next objective will be to define some basic parameters that play a central role in the
main results of this paper and to establish some useful inequalities and equalities interrelating
these parameters.
For _< k < n, define a,,k > 0, n, > 0, rnn, > 0, , > 0, An, > 0, and
#n,k < 0, as follows"
(4) n- k n- k + n(1
n-1
=s+ =s+ s ),




On,k?Ytn+ k OZn+ ,k ?Ttn, k On+ ,k On,k(6) A, #,k
?Ttn+ ,k TlZn,k Trtn+ ,k ?Ttn,k
Note that a, and n, do not depend on f. Using these parameters, the value of the
game VM V(pM, qM) appearing in (2)can now be stated (although proof that it is indeed
the value is the subject of the subsequent sections).
Recall that k is the optimal cutoff value for the classical secretary problem with n objects
and so sn-ln_ --> > snn-I and k _< kn+l _< kn nt- 1. Set rn rn,k, , n,k,, a,
c,k,, and ,k,.
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DEFINITION. For all M 3> f(1),
(7)
ifmn <_ M < ran+ and kn+ kn, or
ifmn <5. M < n and k,+ k, + 1,
if, <_ M < mn+ and kn+l kn + 1.
Notice that Vm, an, and v-,
-
when kn+l kn + 1.
Example 2.3. For the canonical expected-value case f(i) i,
(m3,m4,4, m5) ( l, lO1 __69 317)29 ’17’ 75
(3 ll 25 10 26)(ct3,1, o4,1, o5,1, oz4,2, o5,2) 7’ 29’ -J’ 27’ 75
(m3,l,m4,1,m51,m4,2,ms,2)= (19 101 313 97 317)7 29’ 73 ’27’ 75
(/3,1,/4,1,,4,2)_ (47 459 54)78’ 852’ 107 and
(-5-39-4)(#3,1, #4,1, #4,2) 7---’ 852 107
and together with (7) these yield the value VM V(PM, qM) in Example 1.2. []
The next lemma establishes some useful inequalities.
LEMMA 2.4. For n > 1,
(i) forfixed k, a,k is decreasing in n > k;
(ii) forfixed k, mn,k/On,k and mn,k are increasing in n > k;
(iii) forfixed n, a, is maximized at k k a,,k is increasing in k, <_ k <_ k, and
decreasing in k, kn <_ k <_ n;
(iv) forfixed n, mn,/a,,k and mn,k are minimized at k kn; they are decreasing in
k, <:_ k <_ kn and increasing in k, kn <_ k <_ n;
(v) < a, < a_;
(vi) > m, > ren-l;
(vii) , _> a+l when kn+l kn + 1;
(viii) mn,,+, <_ <_ mn+l < rrn+l,k, when kn+l k + 1; and
(ix) ,k,k > 0 and #,, < O.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 2.2 (iv),
1/a,, s -at. (T ]) n--1/(kSk_l) < 8k -+-(?- k + 1)/(kS_l)







Also, (i), (4), and Lemma 2.2 (vii) give
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From (4), (5), and Lemma 2.2 (vii) note that
n----------- Sk f(k)ks_ n- k (n-
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n-k n-k- -"
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(1	 - s~-l )(ns~=: - (n - k)) 
k  l)sn-lk-l 
t n   ==   l in    t 1  s~: 1   lt. 
i  o  ), 
mn,  _ m ,  _ (1 - ~-l) (npn+l _ Fk ) . 
- - k + 1 n n-lQn, 	 Qn,  sk-l 
MINIMAX-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE BEST-CHOICE PROBLEM 943
Hence
Again using the inequality n--1sk_ > (n k)/n and (8),
n(Fnn+l --ran,k)-
n--1 n--1 From (ii) and (iv)whence ,, mn,k is > 0 or _< 0 according as > sk or _< sk
above, m, mn,kn Tin,kn+ ( ?Ttn+l,kn+ mn+l.
(vii) Similarly,
"n,k On+l,k+l (k + 1)s
which is < 0 or > 0 according as k < k,+ or k _> k,+; taking k kn < kn+l gives the
result.
(viii) Note that
n (1;?n+ TLFr+ nmn+l,k+l mn,k (1 8k) . k+l ’3k)
and it follows using the expression in the proof of (vii) above that
Observe from (8) that mn+l,k+l < Fnn+l and using ns’ > n k gives
n+l (n- k)mn+l,k+l n8k (F+1+l mn+l,k+l O,
from which it may be seen that, < rn,+ < m,+l,k, by setting k k, < k,+ and using
(iv) above. That mn,kn+, < n in this case follows in a similar fashion.
(ix) The conclusion follows easily from (6) and (i)-(viii) above. [2
The next lemma records some useful identities relating the parameters.
LEMMA 2.5. For <_ k < n, thefollowing equations (9)-(17) hold:
On+l,k On,k(9) __a’’k On’k n,k
TFtn,k ran,k mn+l,k ran,k
On,kmn+ ,k On+ ,kmn,k(10) On,kmn,k On,kmn,k "n,k
mn,k mn,k mn+l,k mn,k
Ogn+l k+l On,k(11) __On’k On’k+l Pn,kT1
mn,k ?Ttn,kTl mn+l,k+l mn,k
 I - M  I    I   
e  
[ (1 1)]mn,k mn,kmn,k - mn,k == lin,k -- - -- + m n k -- - -­lin,k o'n,k ' o'n,k lin,k 
== lin,k(I - s~-l) [n(Fn+1 _ m ) _ Fi: - (n - k)mn,k] . 
k + 1 n n,k n-l
sk-l 
gai    ali  ~=:   - j   ), 
( 1 _ ) _ Fi: - (n - k)mn,k (Fn+1 _ Fi:) 0   mn,k n-l > n n k > ,
sk-l n-
he  mn,k - n,   :::;  1  S~-l  1 :::; ~-l. o     
a e, n == n,  :::; mn,kn+1 < mn+l,kn+1 == n+l. 
i  i ilarl , 
(1 - sk)(nsk - (n - k)) 
I)sk 
hi   :::;         n+1   2: n 1;   ==   1   
lt. 
ii  ot  t 
1 - sn)(F 1 - nFn lsn) n+l, l _ n,  k l n k 
Q,n+l,k+l lin,k (k+I)sk 
  low    r    f  i   t 
_ _ [mn+1,k+l mn,k ( 1 1)]
mn+l,k+l - mn,k == Q,n,k - =-- + mn+l,k+l =-- - ---­Q,n+l,k+l Q,n,k Q,n,k Q,n+l,k+l 
_ lin,k(I - sk) [Fn+1 (k) n (Fn+1 )]
- (k + I)sk k+l - n - mn+l,k+l - nSk n - mn+l,k+l . 
bser  rom  t n+l, l  ;:+l   nSk   -   
Fr:.t/ - n l, l - S  F;:+l - n+l, l) < 0, 
rom hi   a    t m n :::; m n+1   n+1,kn  in   == n  n+1   
 e. at n,kn+1 :::; m n    low    il  . 
  l  low  i  rom   ii  e. 0
 
 t em    f l ti  in   eters.
 
 . .  1 :::;   , low  t   l 
 
lin,k - Q,n,k Q,n+l,  - li ,  .
- == J-tn,k == -,
mn  - m ,   n+l,  - m ,  
) 
lin,k - Q,n, l _ _ Q, l, l - li ,  .(11) 
- J-tn, +l - _ ,
n,  - mn,k+l n+l, l - n,  
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(12) On,k+lrrtn,k__ On,kmn,k+l /n,k+l
mn,k mn,k+
Ogn,k ?Ttn+ ,k+ Ogn+ ,k+ mn,k
mn+l,k+l mn,k
(13) -s8= Ogn+l,k 8_ Ogn,k n-1 n,knkSk_l s_
(14) sk mn+l,k ! --..8.k, mn,k k + mn,kn-1 n-1
-n,k8k_ Ogn+l,k 8_ On,k nksk_ s_
n--l(sr- 1)(15) mn+,- mn,k On+l,k- Ogn,k nkan,sk_
mn+l,k mn,k On+l,k --On,k On,k(k + 1)
8k_l(1 8k ).(16) mn,k mn,k mn+,k m,k nk-,k
n -1
m+1,k m,k m+1,k m,k an+ 1,k (k +
(17)
n--1 Fnn+l"n,k TtSk-1 Fk
n-1- (Tt-- ])n,k 78k_
Proof. It is sufficient to prove just one side of the relations (9)-(12) in each case. For
example, for (9) think of the slopes of the lines joining the points (ran,k, a,), (n,k, ,)
and (m+l,, a+,). To prove (9) and (10), first note that
(18) "
?Ttn+ k /O + k ?Ttn k /On k n k/-n k --(?Ttn’k/On’k)
(1/On+l,k) (1/On,k) (1/-n,k) (1/OZn,k)
which follows by observing that
n--1 n--1(_, --(-(1 sk k)) nks_ (1 sk





To see (9) (and hence (10)), notice that (18) implies that
 . P. I   . P.  
 
 
k  1 ) 11"k. 11,-111, =-,( k 1Sk-l O',11"k 
- k- 11,-1 (11, 1) 11, l k - 11"k _ a 11, l k a11"  _   11" kS _l Sk - . 
 11,+l,  - 11"k - ',11,+l,  a11"  - a11"k(    , 
11, (1 11,-1)11"k - 11"k == 1 _  11, l,  - 11"k _ -O',11" kS l - S  .) 
 11, l  - 11"k  11,+l  - 11"k -  11, l   1) 
nS11,-l p11,+l _ p11, 
_ A11"  l 11, k 
ns11,-l (n - k) .J-L11"k -l 
r of   f t   t     io     . r 
ple,   n    o    in    i t  m11"k, 11"k), m11"k, li11"k) 
 11,+l,k,  11,+l,k).     ),  t  t 
_ A11"k _ (m11, l, /a 11,+l,k) - (m11" a11" ) _ (m11"k li11" ) (m11"k/a11" 
J-L11"k - l a 11,+l, ) - l a 11"  - l li11"  - l a 11"  , 
hi  low    t 
nks11, - s~-I) ns~=: (n  (1 - 11,-l)k-l  1 1
------
] 
(k + l)s11,-l l [  11,+l,  a11"k-l 
 
     )), t  t  pli  t 
(m11,+1,k/an+l,k) - (m11"k/a11"k)] + m11"k 
[J-L11"k (l/a 11" k) - (l/a 11,+l,k) a11"k 
(m11"k/li11"k) - (m11"k/a11"k)] + m11"k 
[ (l/a11" k) - (l/li11" k) a11"k 
m 11, k - m 11, k
-' , 
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The relations (11) and (12) are derived in an identical manner after proving that
n,k+l (llO n+l,k+l) (1/Cn,+,)
(1/n,k) (1/OZn,k+l)
which comes from the calculations
(8-’ 1)(n- k- ns)




On,k On,k+l n--1k+l s
n--1 [Tnn+l,k+l mn,k+l=ns(1--sk OnWl,k+l On,k+
The identities (13)-(16) may be obtained from direct calculation from the definitions (4)
and (5). []
3. The optimal Q-strategy. For each pair n, k, < k < n and < j < k + 1, define
(19) q’a )kn,k + #n,kFj_
1- sj-,)n,a- #n,a (il(f(i)/(i.= + 1))+ f(j 1)
where an empty sum is zero, and define the strategy q,, (q,,, q,,k2 ,’’’,qn’k, 1, 1,...).
Using these strategies, the minimax-optimal Q-strategies qM appearing in (2) can now
be given.
DEFINITIONS. For all M > f(1),
(20)
n(M) n when mn _< M < ran+l;
kn if rnn M < rrtn+l and kn+ k,n, or
k(M) if mn <_ M < n and k,+ kn + 1,
kn+l if, <_ M < rnn+l and kn+l kn + l;
qM qn(M),(M).
and





q4’2 ( 50 14107’ 19’ 1, 1,...
and together these yield the minimax-optimal qM in Example 1.2. []
 I - M  I    I   
 io         ti l anner   t 
_ An,k+l _ (mn+l,k+l/CXn+l,k+l) - (mn,k+l/CXn,k+l) 
J-Ln,k+l	 - I/CX l, l  - I/CX k+l) 
_ (mn,k/an,k) - (mn,k+l/CXn,k+l) 
- l/an,k) - I/CX , l  , 
hi  es rom  l o  
_1 1_ = (S~-l - 1)(n - k - sk) = nsn(1 _ sn-l) [1 1] 
- (k 1) n-l k k - -­CXn,  CXn, l  sk	 CXn+l,k+l CXn, l 
 
n,  _  n,k l == (l-s~-I) ( 
n p n+l_ Pk+l) 
- CXn, l k  1 n -lCXn, 	 sk 
_ n(1 -l) [mn+1,k+l  n,k+l]
- nSk sk -. 
CXn+l, l CXn, l 
 ti  )  a   t  rom i t l o  rom  fi i io   
 ). D 
.  t al -st . r  i  , , 1 ~   an  1 ~  ~   ,  
	 
A ,   r-vn,//. pjj-l 
. 2	 )'
- - ( ~(f(i)/(i  )   -S -1An,k /-Ln,k 
her   pt  u   ,    rateg  n,k == ~,k  ;,k  ... , q~,  , , ... ). 
si   i ,  i i ax-opti al -st t i   r      
 . 
FI I I S.  l    f(I  
n(M)	 == n{ ;:.hen 7tn;;n ~ ~ ~n~t~+l and k + = k , ort	  
 ) == i  n ~   m n  n+1 ==   , 
1 i  m n ~   m l  1 ==   1;  
qM == qn( ),k( ). 
pl  . . r  ct l    i  ==   low  rom  l o   
pl   t 
,1 = (:3,1,1, ...), 
, I = (~~~ , 1, 1, · . -),  
42 (50 14 )q' == 107' 19' 1, 1, . .. , 
   i   i i ax-opt al   pl  . . D 
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First it must be shown that qn,k E Q for all < k < n; that is, each coordinate must be
shown to be a probability.
<j<_k+l <n,O<q’k <LEMMA 3.2. For 1.
First, the numerator of qj,k is > 0. This is because An,k + ll,n,kFJ_Proof.
Ozn,kOZn+l,k ?’nn+l,k rnn,k
Tln+l,k mn,k On+l,k OZn,k OZn,k On+l,k
On,kOn+l,k [Tt--k-- ( F:+1 ) n-],g ( .F Fj-1 >0,mn+l,k mn,k
(21)
by Lemma 2.2 (iv) and (v) and the fact that F/(n k) exceeds FJ_ for j < k + 1. Denote
the denominator of q,k in (19) by/3j. Then to show/j > 0, note that
/j /j+l ()n,k "- #n,kFj_l)/j > O,
by (21) for j < k + l, so it is sufficient to show that/3+1 > 0. But now, from (4) and (5)
calculate that
( ) nF? 1(1 8kOn,k)On+l,k mn+l,k mn,k
_
frtn+l,k ?Ttn,k On+l,k On,k On,k On+l,k
(22) F:+’ F ] >0"mn+l,k mn,k n-- k + n k
n,kTo show that qj ,k <_ for j _< k + l, note that the statement that qj _< is equivalent to
j-2 f(i) ) <7j =/n,k(1 + 8j-l).qt_ #n,k -1 + f(J 1) + Z +i=l
n,kThus it is sufficient to show that ’)’j+l ")/j
_
0 for j <_ k and qk+l
--
1. First, using (4) and
the expressions for the numerator and denominator from above, showing that
qn, ks--(F:+ -(n- k + 1)Fk+’) ks_,(F -(n- ]g)fkk+l) <k+, (n- k)F:+l -(n- k + 1)Fff
is equivalent after rearrangement to showing that
(23) -[(ks’_)/(n- k + 1)l < (F+’/(n- k + 1))- Fkk+l]gSk_ )/(/Z- k)] (Fk /(TL- ]g)) F-t-1
But by the convexity of 1/i in i, the left-hand side of (23) is dominated by (n- k)/(n- k- 1),




and since F]_ is increasing in j and #,,k < 0, to prove that 3’j+1 > 3’j for j < k, it is
sufficient to show that
(24) ,Xn,k >_ kF+l (k- 1)F;k_llZn,k
 . P. I   . .  
i t  ust   t ,     l  1 :S   ; t   r i t  ust  
    r babilit . 
 . .  1 :S j :S   1 :S n, 0 :S qj,k :S . 
r of irst,  erat r  j    O. i    ,   J-Ln,k l-1 == 
il k il l, 
 




 n+l,  - n, 
 
 
 a .        t r j(  -   J-l   :S   . enot  
 inat r  j,     {3j.   how {3j  , t  t 
{3j - {3j l == A ,  + J-Ln,  l-1)/j  0, 
    :S   1,    f t  o  hat {3k l  O. ut , rom    
l l  t 
 
 o  t qj,k :S 1   :S   1, t  t  atem t t qj,k :S 1  i l t  
_ ( j . j-2 i)) 
"Ij - An,k(   Sj-l) + /-In,  Fj _ 1  f ] - ) 8 i + 1 :S 1. 
 i   f t  o  t "Yj l - Yj 2:    :S   ~:1 :S . irst,    
 r    erat r  inat r rom e, i  t 
n
-
1( n+1 (    I) k+1) - sn (Fn (  k)Fk 1)n,k _ k-l k k k-l k k < 1 
qk+l - (n - k)F;:+1 - (  -   I)FJ: ­
 i l t  range t  i  t 
1 [( k l) (n   I ] < F;:+l / n   I)) - F:+1  
1 - [(ks~=: n -  - r n - k)  - F:+  . 
ut   exit   j i    t-han      inat   n  / (n  ), 
hi   m  inat    g -ha      a .   r ore, 
1Yj+l - Y  == An,  + J-Ln,k(  l+ - j - I l-1)]/j, 
  J-l      J-Ln,   ,   t "Yj l 2: "Yj   :S  it i  
f t   t 
 - An,k ~ kF:+ 1 - (k - I) : 1. J-Ln,  
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From (17),
(25) re,k T8F+1 F > (n -]- k- 1)F+1 2(k- 1)(F/(n- k))
re--(n-k) n-k+l#n,k risk_
the last inequality because, by the convexity of 1/i,
l(n_k) (1 ) (n-k)(n+k-1)-<
Finally, it may be seen that the right-hand side of (25) exceeds that of (24) using Lemma 2.2
(iii) again. []
It is now possible to prove an inequality that will imply that if the Q-player uses strat-
egy qM, then it forces the P-player to put positive probability mass only on the points
1,2,..., k(M), n(M), n(M) / 1. Recall the definitions of qM and VM.
PROPOSITION 3.3. For all M > f(1),
(26) V(p, qM) _> VM for all p (Pl,P2,’" ") 79M,
with equality in (26) if and only ifj: pjf(j) M and p assigns positive mass only to
points in { 1,..., k(M), n(M), n(M) + 1}.
Proof. By the definitions of qM and VM, it is enough to show
(27) V(p,qn’k) >_ ,n,k
--
#n,kM, for all p
with equality if and only if j_ pjf(j) M and p assigns positive mass only to points
{ 1,..., k, n, n + }. First observe that





(29) qi jAn,k + jf(j #n,k
i=l m=l
For strategies p (p, P2,’" ") and q (q, q2,’" "), recall (1) and define the Lagrangian
L(p,q) V(p,q)+ )n,k E pj
--
#n,k M- E PJf(J)
j=l j=l
jl Pj qmAn k -]- Pn kM + qi An kj P,jI(j)m
"= i=l m=l
(30)
The dependence of L on n and k will be suppressed in the notation. For p PM, since Pn,k <
0, it is immediate that V(p, q) L(p, q), with equality if and only if j= pjf(j) M.
When q qn,k it is now sufficient to show that the coefficient of pj/j in (30) is 0 for all j
and is 0 if and only if j l, 2,..., k, n, n + 1. But for j k this is tree from (29).
 I - M  I    I   
o  ), 
_ An,  ns~=: ;:+I - l: >  +  l)F;:+1 - k l)(FkI(n  
J-Ln,  n ~=:-(n-k) - l 
  ali  se,   exit   /i, 
n-l<!( -k)(! _1_)==(n-k)(n k-l)
sk-I-2 n n+k-l 2n(k-l)· 
i all ,  a    t  g -ha      t    a .  
 i . D 
   ssi l     ali  t ill l  t   -pl r  ­
 '     -pl r  t si  abili  as  l    i t  
, , ..  , ), ), ) + . ecall  fi i io     . 
SI  . .  l    f(I  
) 
i  alit   ) if  l  fE~1 jf(  ==     sit  ass l   
i t   I   , ), ), )  I . 
r of   fi i io     v ,     o  
it  ali    l   E~l jf j  ==     si  as  l   i t  
I   , , ,   I  i t  t j ( (j-l  )n'k) )(28) II 1 - q: = 1 - SjAn,  - /-Ln,  l; m ~ 1  f(j) 
 
 
r e   == PI, , ...    == l'  ...  ll     a r i  
(p,q) = (p,q)  An,  (1 -t. j) + /-Ln,  (  -t. jf(j)) 
= ,k + /-Ln,k M  t.; It qi 111 (1 - ~) - ,ki - /-Ln,ki f(j)] . 

 
    a   ill  r    t t . r  E ,  J-Ln,  
 
,   ediat  t (p,  2 ( , ), it  ali    l   E~l jf j  == .
 
he   == ,     f t  o  t  effi t  Pj /     2   l  
 
 == l    == 1, .. ,  ,   . ut  1 :s;  :s;    ru  rom ).
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For j > k the coefficient of pj/j is
(31)
from (29), with the convention that an empty product is 1. Using (4)-(6) and (22) and putting
G F/(r s) for r > s, (31) reduces to






Note that 6n 6,+1 0, and
8L--1 8k--I (c+l 8k-1(j+l--j j-k+ j- k --Gk)-- n-k+
8.-- ) (cj.+_ -of).
But, using Lemma 2.1 (ii), G+ G is positive and nondecreasing and the expression
(S_l/(j k + 1)) (sk_/(j k)) is negative and increasing in j > k; hence (Sj+ <
for j < n and (Sj+ > (Sj for j > n, which shows that (31) is > 0 when j > k, j n, n + 1,
which completes the proof.
Once the analogue of Proposition 3.3 is proved for the P-strategy (Proposition 4.2 below),
this will establish the minimax-optimality of both qM and PM and that vM is the value of the
game.
4. The optimal P-strategy and main theorem. For < k _< k, < n, define distribu-
n,ktions p’, (p,k, P2 ...) concentrated on the points { 1,2, k, n} by
O,,k/(j + 1)
p.,k OZn,k Sk_ n--1--)/’-qk-
n-Ino,,k/(ksk_
forl <_j < k,
forj k,
forj =n,
nkwith pn,k =_ 0 otherwise. Note that p is a distribution only for k < k, and that mn,k
y]j= Jf(j)p.’. Setp’ p’,k- forn >_ 2, andp (1,0,0,...). Also, when kn+l k,+l,
define the distribution n (], ,...) concentrated on { 1,2,..., kn, n, n + } by
-n/(j + 1)
p- -,n2(s. 1)/(k. + 1)
n--1nTb(Tb
-
l)(1 8kn )/(]gn -I- 1)
for _< j _< k,,
forj =n,
forj n+ 1,
with p-- _= 0 otherwise. Note that mn= -j=l f(J)P"
Remark. The distributions p’, n 1,2,... are exactly the minimax-optimal P-player
strategies for the N < n problem studied in Hill and Krengel (1991).
 . P. I   . P.  
r     effi t  Pj  j  
t q~,k Ii (1 -q:k) + IT (1 -q:k) t Ii (r ~ 1) 
i=l m=l m=l i=k+l r=k+l 
( ) - An,kj - Mn,kjf(j) == An,k(k - j) - Mn,kF~ + ks{=~ 
k-l f(.) )] 
. [ 1 - Sk>'n,k - I-ln,k ( 8i +t 1 + f(k) , 
rom ), it   e t  t  pt  ct  . si      t n  
c~ == ; (  -         
 - s Qn,k)  - S Qn+l,k)(j -  ) 8j 
mn+  - n,  
her  
j-I -l  
8-== sk-l (cn+1_cn)_ sk-l (Cn+1_Cj )+ sk-l (Cn-Cj). 
J j-k k k n-k k k - l k k 
ot  t 8  == 8n 1 == ,  
sn sn-l)
cn+l_cn)_ k-l _ ~ (Cj+1-cj).
k k ( l n-k k k 
ut,  a   {+l - C{  si   decr    r  
{_l/(j -    - {=~/  -   at   n       8j +1 8j 
   an  8j+1 8j    , hi   t  i  ° h    ,  -1= ,   , 
hi  plet   f. 0 
nc     r osit       - e  sit  .  ), 
 ill l   ini ax-opti alit   t    P   t V       
e. 
.  t al - e   ai  . r 1 :::;  :::; n  ,  i ib ­
io  n,k == ~,  p~,k,  centr    i t  I  , ... , ,   
 1 :::;   , 
  ==  
 j = n, 
it  Pj,  == ° is . ot  t n,k   i ib io  l    :::; n  t n,  == 
E~l f(j)Pj,k. t n == n, n  2: , l == , ,0,·, .). lso, henk 1 == n l, 
  i ib io  pn == CPI' P2:, ...) centr   I  ..  , n , ,   I   
 1 :::;  :::; n , 
 j = n, 
  ==   , 
it  j == ° t is . ot  t t  == E~  (j)pj. 
ark.  i ib io  n,  ==   ...  ct   i i ax-opt al - l r 
e     :::;  em   ill  r el ). 
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The minimax-optimal (worst-case distribution) strategy PM in (2) for player P can now
be shown to be convex combinations of these base strategies pn and
DEFINITION. For all M > f(1), define PM E 79M by
mn+ M pn +
ran+ Tln Tln+ n
if k+ k and m _< M < m,+;
-
M p +(32) PM mn mn mn
if kn+ kn + and m <_ M < -;
mn+ M pn +
mn+ mn rrn+ mn
if kn+ kn + and n <_ M < mn+.
Notice that the strategy PM places positive probability mass only on the points in the set
{ ,..., (M), (M), (M) + } ad that, whe, + , is a cheowrpoi in
that when M increases through the value M -n, PM increases the number ofpoints in its
support by 1.
Example 4.1. For the expected-value case f(i) i, it follows from the calculations in
Example 2.3 that
p3--p3’l ( 67,o,,o,o,...
(2- 24 )p4 p4,1 ,0,0, -,0,0,.’.
(1- 4 10 0,0,.-.) and-4 ,0,0, 17’ 17’
00 ), ,0,0,,0,0,...
and together these yield the minimax-optimal strategies PM in Example 1.2. []
Now the analogue of Proposition 3.3 will be proved, which, together with Proposition
3.3, will establish the minimax-optimality of qM and PM simultaneously.
PROPOSITION 4.2. For all M > f(1),
(33) V(pM, el) <_ VM for all q (ql, q2,’" ") E Q.
Proof. The argument of Theorem C of Hill and Krengel (1991) demonstrates that
V(p’k for0<qi< 1, i= 1,,(q,q,...,q, 1, 1, ..)) c,,
and a similar argument shows that, when kn+l n -t- 1,
V(On, (q,q,... ,qkr+,, 1, 1,’" ")) n, for0 _< qi <_ 1, 1,... ,n+.
Furthermore, Hill and Krengel (1991) established that for any q (q, q,...) Q and
(34) V(p’,q) _< V(p’, (q,... ,q, l, 1,...)) <_ V(p’, (q,... ,qkn, 1, 1,...)) On,
 I - M  I    I   
 i i ax-opt al orst  i ib o  rateg  P     r    
     binati     e  n  pn. 
FI I I .  ll   f(I  fi  P   PM  
mn+l - M) n + ( M- m n ) pn +1 E PM( mn l - m  m l - m n 
mn - ) n ( M- m n ) -n P 
_ _ PEM( m n - n n - n	  == 
i  +1 ==   1  n ::;   m n; 
_ __ _1 _-_M_) -n + ( M - m n ) n+l E P ( _ P _ P M l -  n m l - n 
 +1 ==   1  m n ::;   l. 
oti  t  e  P  l  sit  r babilit  ass l    i t    t 
I, ... , k( ), n(M), n( )  I} nd t, en kn+1 == kn , m n   hangeover oint  
t    hro     == m n , P    ber f i t    
ort  . 
pl  . . r  ct l   i  ==   low  rom  l o   
pl   t 
 = ,1 = (~,o,~,o,o, .. -), 
 = ,  = (;9,0,0  ~:,o,o, .. -) , 
:=4 ( 3 4 10 )P == 17, , , 17' 17,0,0, ... , and 
5 5 2 (13 2 60 )P == P' == 75 ' 75 ,0,0, 75 ,0,0, . .. , 
   i   i i ax-opti al e  P   pl  . . D 
    r osit   ill  , hic ,  it  r osit  
. , ill l   ini ax-opti alit     P  ult usl . 
SI  . .  l    f(I  
 
r of  g ent  e    ill  r el ) onstrat  t 
( n ,k (ql q2, ..  qk, , ,···  == 0n,k, orO::; i::; ,  = , ... ,k, 
  il  g ent  t, h  k  1 == kn + , 
 (p  , ql , 2, .. , n I , , ...  == an, r  ::; i ::; , i == .   kn 1• 
r ore, ill  r el ) sh  t    == Ql, Q2, .. ) E   
k 2:: kn , 
  ( n, ) ::;  ( n, Ql, ...  Qk, 1,  )  ::;  ( n, Ql , ... , Q
n
, ,  .. )  == n, 
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and again it is straightforward to prove that when kn+ kn + and k > kn+,
(35) V(n,q) < V(n, (q,...,qk, 1, 1,...)) < V(’, (q,...,qk,+,, 1, 1,...)) En.
Three cases corresponding to the three possibilities in (32) must be considered.
Case 1. kn+ kn and mn <_ M < mn+.
V(PM,q)= mn+l M V(pn,q)+ V ,q)
( )n
--
On+l An kn + n,kn M,
mn+ mn mn+ mn
for all q Q, using (34).
Case 2. kn+] kn + and mn M < n. Using the relations in (9)-(16) and setting
M it may be seen that n, whence
( ) ( M-mn ) pn+l,knPM mn+l,k --M pn +nWl,kn mn mnWl,kn n
Note from Lemma 2.4 (viii) that for M in this range, M mn+l,k. For any q Q,
V(PM q) n+l,kn M Y(p, q) + V q),
n+l,kn mn mn+l,kn mn
which, by (34), is dominated by
(36) m+,k m
+ g(p+,, (q,..., q+, , ,...)).
Now consider the coefficient of qk+ =1 (1 q/m) in (36) which equals
n’ rrtn+l,kn M (1 sk, +n mn+l,kn mn
oz ( mn___+ M
n mn+l,kn n 8n-Ikn--1
Reaanging this expression as
nn+l,kn 8kn mn+l,kn M 8k M mn
k(m+k --m) sn-1 + skn- nl,kn kn--1 n
d using (13) and (14) (with k kn) this equals
for M < n. It follows that (36) is not decreased by taking qk+1 1, SO it may be seen that
\ mn+l,kn ?Ttn /
( M-mn ) (pn+l,k, (ql qkn "’’)),+ V ,...,mnW ,kn mn
 . P. I   . .  
 i    raightforw    t he  k +1 ==   1   2: 1, 
  p ,  :S  p  , q1 , ... , qk, ,  .  :S  pn , ql , ... , qkn+" ,  )  == a . 
r   sp     sibilit    ust  si r . 
s  . 1 ==   n :::;    n l. 
 l   E ,  ). 
s  . 1 ==   1  n :S   m n . si   io     in  
 == m n it a    t t Pmn == Pn' he c  
 +1 k - ) n (M - m )PM == n, n  .n n 1, n .( mn+l,kn ~  n n+l,  - m n 
ot  rom a .  ii  t     ,  :S n l, n . r   E , 
n(P , ) == (mn+1,kn - M) V( n, ) ( M- m ) (pn+1,kn, ), 
m n+1,kn -  n  n+1,k  - n 
hic ,  ),  inat   
mn+1,kn - M ) V( n ( 1 ))P, q1, ... ,qkn+l,l, , .. ' ( 
n n n (36) m +1,k - m ( M - m n ) (n+1 k ( )) Vp 'n,ql, ... , kn+1,1,1,···. 
m n+1,kn - m n 
 si r  effi t  kn 1 TI~=l  - m/m)   hi  al  
k ( ) n+l,kn (M )P ' n mn+l,kn - (1 _ S~:I) + Pn+1 - m n (1 - SkJ 
  n+l,k  - n n + 1 mn+l,kn - m n 
== an (mn+1,kn - ) (1 ~~FI) + a n+l,kn ( M- m n ) (1 -Skn ) 
kn mn+l,kn - m n skn-l kn mn+l,kn - m n skn-l . 
rrangi   r   
  :S m n .  low  t   t    kn 1 == , so  a    t 
1V(PM,q) :S (mn+ ,kn - M) V(pn, (q1, ... ,qkn , 1, 1,,· .)) 
n+l,  - m  
 - m n ) n+l k (   , n, l, , n , 1, 1, ... ,( 
n+l,kn - n 
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which in turn implies that
a + a+, , + #,,M.
Tn..b k Tl TYnq- k ?T
Case 3. kn+l kn -+- andn < M < m,+. It follows from (34) and (35) as in Case
that
using (11) and (12).
The main results in this paper can now be summarized in the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.3. With PM, qM, and VM as in (32), (20), and (7), respectively,
V(PM,q <_ V(PM,qM)- VM <_ V(p, qM), for all p 79M, q Q.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Propositions 3.3 and 4.2 and the definitions. []
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